






Approaching the Individual: Survey of Descartes, Locke, Husserl, and Nagel
	The modern Western concept of the individual begins first with the question of oneness. What does it means to be one? Herein I will briefly discuss how Descartes, Locke, Husserl, and Nagel, as important and interesting philosophers on this idea, treat the concept of the individual. Though this paper deals with a modern Western concept, it does so in the interest of providing philosophical background to my larger research interest in Muhammad Iqbal's ideas of the individual and the individual's relationship to the community; Iqbal's philosophy asks next, 'what does it mean to be one in a community?' and thereby necessitates this background inquiry.
	The following discussion of the individual will focus on: 1) what it means to have an inner unity of consciousness, 2) identifying and recognizing oneself as an individual (and as that individual doing the identifying), and 3) the discovery that follows of one's own agency. By inner unity of consciousness I mean having thoughts and sensations and knowing that these thoughts and sensations belong to the same consciousness reflecting on them (1). This type of self-awareness is inseparable from the question of what it means to be an individual and serves as the basis for identifying one's own consciousness as an individual vis-à-vis seeing it as one's own (2). Having identified oneself as an individual, one's thoughts, like desires and ambitions, become meaningful in the sense that they are attainable in light of individual agency (3). To put it more simply, if I am an individual and I have thoughts, I can attempt to act upon these thoughts in various ways according to my idea of myself.
	Descartes' account of the individual in Meditations argues that the 'I' is a finite thinking substance and insofar as 'I' can have thoughts of my own, I am an individual. My existence as a thinking substance is undeniable. Descartes suggests that individuality derives not from the body—res extensa—but from the thought content of specific cogito. The res cogitans is more real in Descartes' view than the res extensa, which is only appearance; thus thought is the creative activity of the individual rather than physical exertion. Consciousness (cogito) is thinking. The cogito recognizes itself as an individual because its thoughts are its being and it can conceive of itself without the thought of other finite substances, whether mental or material. Because thinking is the activity of the individual, by merely having thoughts the cogito is exercising its agency as an individual. The thoughts of one cogito are just that; in this way, thoughts substantiate the being of that individual and the content (not that the substance is thinking, but what it is thinking on) differentiates it from many other cogitos.
	Descartes poses the most influential issue for modern conception of individuals—that of the so-called mind-body problem. Broaching this question is asking how it is that persons are individuals, e.g. am I a body or mind, and how can I be both? I am a specific mind and I have a general body in this account of the individual as a thinking substance thinking. The body is only an appearance of individuation amongst material substance—Strawson grapples with this in his comment that “Uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian soul.”​[1]​ Since uniqueness is derived from the mental rather than the material, material substance plays a peripheral (if any) role in what it means to be an individual. Because the activity of the individual is thinking, conceptualizing one's own agency emphasizes imagination, nostalgia, and other thoughts over any behavior.
	The notions of inner unity suggested by Descartes are similar to those found in Locke, who describes consciousness as “it essentially appears to itself. It's being is inseparable from self-awareness. Personal identity, then, is a matter of self-consciousness.”​[2]​ Locke distinguishes between thinking substance, soul, and consciousness—it is consciousness which defines the individual as such. Neither the thinking substance nor the soul affords individuality in the same way that consciousness does; for Locke, a person is a “thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it.”​[3]​ What I call inner unity of consciousness is self-evident in his account. Personhood as defined above is how an individual defines himself as the same individual experiencing his experiences over time and thereby identifies himself as a potential agent. Locke maintains that insofar as consciousness may reflect on actions, anticipate the consequences of those actions, and then initiate action, the individual maintains his agency.
	Locke avoids alienation of the material from the mental (or vice versa) by selecting consciousness as the seat of individuality, and by redefining consciousness as not only self-awareness but that function of memory which unites present thought and sensation with past thought and sensation. However, by pinning what it means to be a certain individual onto this function of consciousness called memory, Locke falls into a new set of possible criticisms. For example, if individuality and one's recognition of it rest in memory, there are plenty of instances in which memory is weak. More specifically, the question is of the structure of memory—if I have forgotten an event, but I remember myself remembering the event at an earlier moment, do these memories of memories still constitute my identity, i.e. am I perceiving the memory in the same way that I originally perceived the event? When I am not remembering, have I lost those previous moments?
	This criticism yields an important question about the idea of the individual as described above: if I am not immediately perceiving an event, how do I recreate it through memory in such a way that it is the same experiential self-awareness which made it me perceiving the event when it first occurred? There is a problematic implication of the question, which is that if memory recreates a semblance of past experiential data, perhaps memory is no different from imagination—in which case it is not clear how one could be sure that so-called memories correlate to events that were experienced by the same individual remembering/recreating them. In light of these criticisms, perhaps on this view of identity it is impossible to be the same individual in successive moments.
	Locke's foundation of empiricism is echoed in a more refined form by Husserl, whose philosophy emphasizes phenomenological epoché, or bracketing, when conducting analysis—one should take into consideration only one's immediate experience of an object (or person, or event, or any thing) and no other baggage. Because of his extreme focus on phenomena and human experience of them, when there is nothing to experience there is no experiencer. Husserl argues that there is an ego which facilitates observations of oneself and hence self-awareness; when no experience is offering opportunity for self-awareness, there is nothing to constitute being an individual. Consciousness is unified for Husserl when objects present themselves as experiences to an experiencer, who is thereby an individual due to simultaneous awareness of the experience and the awareness of that awareness. 
	Egos are individuated by the specific and potentially incommunicable nature of experience. For example, my experience of the purple in a purple scarf is solely my own and though I can describe it, I cannot verify that another consciousness experiences purple in the same way that I just have. Furthermore, to say that this purple is a mixture of blue and red is to say even less about the experience—there is no value in information like that found in color mixing to my experience. Individuals are individuals because of their experience, and become aware and knowledgeable of themselves as themselves through analysis and interpretation of experience. 
	Husserl's idea of personal agency is chiefly articulated in his concept of intentionality. Mental states are states of something. That mental states have a content is exemplified well by desiring; desiring is not an activity fulfilled by itself, but rather it is desiring of something outside of the individual. Intentionality considers the content-aimed nature of mental states and thereby underscores Husserl's focus on experience as a source of knowledge. Objects outside the cogito cannot be considered as they are in themselves because consciousness does not necessitate their being as however they are, and being in consciousness is reality. Therefore objects as being outside themselves are real only insofar as they can be phenomena presented to consciousness. This being in consciousness is what intentionality uses to point at the object. Herein the agency of the individual is unbound: the very reality of every thing relies on its relationship with his own consciousness.
	Nagel zeroes in even further on consciousness as experience by approaching Husserl's ideas of transcendental phenomenology and claiming that other explanations and analyses of conscious experience leave out that which is most essentially experience: the what-it-is-like factor (what Dennett calls qualia). He describes attempting to discover this what-it-is-like and always falling short because “extrapolation from our own case is involved in the idea of what it is like to be a bat, [and so] the extrapolation must be incompletable. We cannot form more than a schematic conception of what it is like.”​[4]​ The extent of an individual's type of experience is the extent to which that individual can conceptualize experience. Nagel responds to the criticism that imagination provides for many concepts yet unexperienced by saying that “one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted for ever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type.”​[5]​ He rejects the argument from the privacy of experience in favor of accepting certain types of experience being qualitatively different to the experiencer. For instance, what-it-is-like for a bat to use echolocation is entirely mysterious to me, even if I close my eyes and flail and maybe attempt to create an echo, the what-it-is-like of that is not at all the same as the bat's. The experience is of a different type and is for this reason unduplicatable by my efforts. My individuality precludes me from knowing qualia that is of any other type.
	In this fashion Nagel also presents an inner unity of consciousness as self-evident; while a consciousness is privy to qualia it is for that reason one consciousness. By reflecting on the what-it-is-like character of being an individual, it is clear that this only describes what-it-is-like for the individual experiencing it. Nagel collapses the differentiation between consciousness and identification of oneself as the experiencer through his definitions more quickly even than Husserl. Furthermore, Nagel describes individual agency in specifically non-behavioral terms. Agency is not manifested in observable behavior because experience of another mind is inaccessible and thus the behavior of others cannot be linked to the experience of that mind. Any description, regardless of how comprehensive it seems, will always be devoid of the what-it-is-like element of experience. Nagel declares, “It is difficult to understand what could be meant by the objective character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends it.”​[6]​
	Each of these thinkers develops the Western concept of the individual and when analyzed within the three-part model suggested above, their ideas present themselves with interesting similarities in regard to the role of experience in self-awareness and their definitions of consciousness. Descartes, Locke, Husserl, and Nagel delineate the individual through ontological arguments of substance and phenomenological arguments of how it is to be a certain way, that is, how it is to be individual. Deprived of a discussion of environing community, the arguments of Husserl especially are rendered less persuasive.​[7]​ However, individuality must be considered prior to work on a community, and it must be determined what it means to be one before one can be among many. Morgan suggests, “Perhaps a strongly stamped group type is a better springboard for significant individuality than is miscellaneous liberty of association.”​[8]​ This statement is highly relevant to the pending paper on Iqbal and his idea of self-development within a community, which can be discussed only in the wake of a rich modern tradition of thought on the individual.
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